337th
Meeting – Tuesday, August 23rd 2011
The Preah Vihear
conflict and
the current political debate in Thailand
A talk and presentation by
Volker Grabowsky,
Asia-Africa-Institute, University of Hamburg
Present: Peter Kouwenbueg, Reinhard Hohler, Dr. Pensupa Sukkata
Jai-Inn, David
James. Mangkhoot Norapong, Ian Bushell, David Steane, Guy Cardinal,
Klaus
Berkmüller, Daniel and Mukda Bellamy, William Starner, Brooke
Schedneck, Ken
Dyer, Derryck Titmus, Hans Bänziger, Zita Clarke, Beatrice Boles,
Glynn Morgan,
Pat Corey, Sue Offner, Art Halbisen, Frederike Neumann, John Cadet,
Mason
Imamura, Joe Norkar, Olivier Evrard, Louis Gabaude. An audience of 28.
The full text of
Volker’s talk
Dear
Brian Hubbard, dear Louis Gabaude, dear ladies and gentlemen. I feel
very
honoured by your kind invitation to deliver a statement on the current
conflict
between Thailand and Cambodia which seems to focus on an old temple
situated
directly on the border between Cambodia and the Thai province of
Sisaket; it is
not far away from the “Emerald Triangle” (Thai: sam
liam mòrakot สามเหลี่ยมมรกต) which links Thailand with Laos and Cambodia.
(=> Foil 2:
Map) This temple is at the core of a conflict the roots of
which were
laid more than a century ago at a time when Cambodia was under French
colonial
rule and Thailand still called by its old name of “Siam”.
Even the name of the
temple (prasat) is highly politicized. Shall we call it
“Preah Vihear”
according to Cambodian pronunciation or better adopt the Thai name
“Phra
Wihan”? (=> Foil
3: View of the temple)
Furthermore, is it an
“ancient Khmer temple” as the Cambodians insist? Or do we
need to call it an
“ancient Hindu temple” as political correctness in Thailand
demands? Actually
it is both an ancient Hindu and an ancient Khmer
temple. Contrary
to what nationalists on both sides of the border might argue, the style
of
architecture, its religious meaning and its alleged ethno-historic
background
have been declared – luckily I would say – totally
irrelevant in the 1962
judgement of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague.
Only for
the sake of simplicity and not because I have the intention to take
sides in
the conflict, I will use throughout my presentation the internationally
preferred Cambodian name “Preah Vihear”.
The first time I
heard of Preah Vihear was in 1979. At that time I was a young student
of
Southeast Asian history at a university in northern Germany. It was in
June
1979 when the Temple made international headlines. More than 40,000
Cambodian
refugees who had sought refuge in Thailand were sent back to their
homeland via
the Preah Vihear Temple. Hundreds, perhaps thousands died when they
descended
the steep path down to the plain of northern Cambodia where they were
caught in
the crossfire between remnants of the Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese troops
who had
invaded and occupied their homeland.
Though I wondered why
the Thais could exercise physical control of Preah Vihear, I had not
the
slightest doubt that this (Khmer) temple actually belonged to Cambodia.
Twenty
years later, in late 1998 and early 1999, when living and teaching in
Vientiane, I got the chance to see Preah Vihear with my own eyes.
Entering the
Temple from the Thai side, I became fascinated by this masterpiece of
architecture and even more fascinated by the unique landscape.
Standing at Pha Mò
I-daeng (ผามออีแดง) and looking
southwards to the forested lower plain of northern Cambodia, I
understood at
once the topography of the Khorat Plateau. In 1998, the damages
inflicted upon
the Temple during decades of warfare were still visible. I clearly
remember the
wreckage of a Vietnamese helicopter only some twenty or thirty metres
from one
of the gopuras. The stones of many temple buildings contained numerous
bullet
holes.
When I entered the Temple
from the small provincial town of Kantaralak I had to pass the border
station
where Thai and Cambodian soldiers were sitting peacefully side by side
and
probably dividing the entrance fee of 100 Baht which each of the few tourists like myself had to pay.
Frankly speaking,
I felt a little bit curious that, given the topography, the Temple
should be on
Cambodian territory but the question of sovereignty was not an issue at
all in
1998 when the Temple had just been made accessible again after many
years of
warfare and uncertainty.
Ten years later, in
July 2008, the Preah Vihear temple made international headlines when
fighting
broke out between Thai and Cambodian troops. This was the point when I
began to
study the Preah Vihear conflict seriously. As an historian I became
most
interested in the primary sources, in particular the 1962 Judgement of
the
International Court of Justice in The Hague.
The skirmishes
between Thai and Cambodian troops in summer and autumn 2008 were
preceded by a
long-standing dispute on the inscription of the temple as Cambodian
World
Heritage in the UNESCO world heritage list.
Not only
were the governments in Bangkok and Phnom Penh in conflict with each
other;
this was and still is also a conflict among rival political camps
inside
Thailand. On July 10th 2008, only two days after the
decision of the
UNESCO in favour of Cambodia, the then Thai Foreign Minister Nopphadon
Patthama
(นพดล ปัทมะ)
declared his resignation, after the opposition had been accusing the
Samak
government to be too compliant towards the Cambodian standpoint. In
Cambodia
the decision of the UNESCO was cheered joyfully.
(=> Foil 4:
Photo from Phnom Penh)
Why can an ancient
temple, situated in a sparsely populated remote border area, still stir
up
nationalist emotions on both sides of the Thai-Cambodian border at the
beginning of the twenty-first century? (=> Foil 5: Cartoon) Unlike hardly
any other
cultural monuments, Prasat Preah Vihear symbolises the vicissitudes of
the
relations between the two neighbours throughout the centuries.
In my presentation I
will first discuss the temple itself and its cultural-historical
significance.
Then I will show how the temple became an object of dispute in later
years.
Thereafter, I will analyse the judgement of the International Court of
Justice
(ICJ) of June 1962 with special emphasis on the judicial position of
the Thai
government since then. Finally I will show how this official position
was used
and manipulated by contending political camps in the current public
discourse.
(=> Foil 6: Structure
of the presentation)
The temple and its historical significance
Please let me make a
few remarks on the history of the temple. First it is needed to mention
the
unique topography. Prasat Preah Vihear is situated in an almost
inaccessible
forest area. The main sanctuary has been built on a rock of the Dongrak
Mountains more than 500 metres above sea level (Pha Mo I-Daeng ผามออีแดง)
(=> Foil 7:
PV 1). This mountain range separates the Khorat Plateau from
the
plain of North Cambodia. The only accessible entrance to the temple
comes from
the North via the Thai district town of Kantharalak (Thai: กันทรลักษ์) in Sisaket province. From the
Cambodian side the temple is only accessible by using a steep,
narrow winding path. (=> Foil
8: PV 2) Prasat Preah Vihear offers
spectacular scenery towards the South over the wide plain of North
Cambodia. (=> Foil 9: PV
Ascendance)
The temple was a key
architectural monument of the Khmer Empire and had been expanded by
various
kings. Preah Vihear is unique as the temple is built along a
north-south axis,
in contrast to the general rectangular construction plan of Khmer
temples with
an orientation towards the east. An 800-metre long ascendency, leading
over
staircases and several gate towers or gopuras ended at a platform in
the centre
of which was the main sanctuary. The Preah Vihear temple was originally
devoted
to the Hindu god Shiva.
We know from old inscriptions the original
name
of the temple: Śikhareśvara, “Summit
of God Shiva” (Skt: śikhara + iśvara).
At least since the rise of Theravada
Buddhism in Cambodia to be the religion
of the state at the end of the thirteenth century, was the Hindu temple
transformed into a Buddhist monastery. The present-day name Prasat
Preah Vihear
probably derives from that time. This name is testified as Wihan Sawan
(“Heavenly
vihāra”) in the 1877 version of the Royal Chronicles of Cambodia,
translated
into Thai in 1917. When the still
powerful Khmer Empire began to reorientate itself towards the sea, the
territories north of the Dongrak Mountains – i.e. today’s
Isan – got out of the
direct control of the Cambodian royal court. The Preah Vihear temple
has since
then been merely of local importance for the Kui or Suai people
inhabiting the
Dongrak Mountains on both sides of the present-day Thai-Cambodian
border. It
seems that the temple was abandoned completely in later times and only
visited
by forest monks for meditation practices. In the year 1899 the Siamese
High
Commissioner (kha luang thesaphiban)
of Monthon Isan visited the inaccessible area south of Kantharalak and
discovered
by mere chance the temple ruins, overgrown by climbing plants. (=> Foil 10: PV
3)
The Siamese- French Treaties of 1904 and 1907 and their
aftermath
The late “discovery”
of the temple more than 110 years ago reflected the geographical
isolation of
the frontier on both sides of the Dongrak mountain range. The Siamese
state
which had conquered the whole region in the last quarter of the
eighteenth
century exercised only a nominal control over this border land by the
end of
the nineteenth century. With the introduction of a centralised system
of
administration, along the lines which the European colonial powers had
implemented in most of their possessions in Southeast Asia, Siam also
took over
the Western concept of a territorial state with clearly defined borders.
When the so called
Pak Nam Incident in July 1893 forced Siam to cede all territories on
the
eastern bank of the Mekong River to France and to accept a
25-kilometres wide “demilitarized
zone” on the western bank, the process of administrative
centralisation was
already in full swing. (=> Foil 11: Map
of territorial cessions) In
this time of change the “discovery” of Prasat Preah Vihear
took place. In the
same year, 1899, new border negotiations between Siam and France
resumed. The
Lao rulers of Luang Prabang and Champassak demanded the return of those
parts
of their principalities which were situated on the western bank of the
Mekong
River and thus had remained under Siamese control after 1893. Moreover,
France
demanded further territorial concession in exchange for the abolishment
of the
demilitarized zone and the withdrawal of French troops from the seaport
of
Chanthaburi.
The tedious
negotiations resulted in the border treaty of February 13th
1904.
This treaty stipulated the border between Siam and the French
protectorate of
Cambodia in Article 1 as follows:
“The frontier between
Siam and Cambodia starts, on the left shore of the Great Lake, from the
mouth
of the river Sung Roluos, it follows the parallel from that point in
the
easterly direction until it meets the river Prek Kompong Tiam, then,
turning
northwards, it merges with the meridian from that meeting-point as far
as the
Pnom Dang Rek mountain chain. From there it follows the watershed
between the
basins of the Nam Sen and the Mekong, on the one hand, and the Nam
Moun, on the
other hand, and joins the Pnom Padang chain the crest of which it
follows
eastwards as far as the Mekong. Upstream from that point, the Mekong
remains
the frontier of the Kingdom of Siam, in accordance with Article I of
the Treaty
of 3 October 1893.” (=> Explanations
according to the Map above)
None of the above
mentioned Articles contained any stipulation pertaining to Prasat Preah
Vihear
in particular. This is not astonishing, as the temple had not yet
entered the
public consciousness of either the Siamese or the Cambodian national
elites.
Prior to 1899 the very existence of the temple was unknown not only in
Bangkok
but also in Phnom Penh and in Hanoi where the French colonial
administration
for Indochina had its seat. The proceedings of the Siamese-French
border
commission of the years provide evidence that Prasat Peah Vihear was
not given
any significance for the discussing the exact borderline.
The Treaty of March 23rd
1907, which amended and replaced the treaty of 1904, determined that a
team of
four French experts should map the results of the mixed Siamese-French
border
commission. The Siamese side at that time did not possess any
comparable
expertise and thus had to trust the accuracy of the French
cartographers. One
of the eleven maps, which were added in late autumn 1907 as appendices
to the
new border treaty of 1907 (each map had a scale of 1:200.000), show the
borderline running slightly north of Prasat Preah
Vihear. All eleven maps were obviously accepted
by the Siamese side. (=> Foil 12: Map
of 1907)
Which position did
Siam and France, respectively Cambodia after this country gained
independence
in 1953, implement with regard to the crucial question of who had the
right to
exercise sovereignty over Prasat Preah Vihear and its vicinity? There
are five
major incidents or developments which are of vital importance for fully
understanding
the judgement of the International Court of Justice in 1962:
1.) In the
period from 1907 to 1929 there was no
visible presence of state authority, neither from the French nor from
the
Siamese government. Visits of Cambodian or French officials from
Kompong Thom
province, to which the Dongrak sector near Preah Vihear belonged, are
not
documented. But also the Siamese side could only claim a few sporadic
visits
from the district seat of Kantharalak situated 15 kilometres north of
the
temple complex. However, it is reported that the inhabitants of a small
village
situated in the vicinity of Prasat Preah Vihear continued to pay taxes
to the
provincial authorities of Khukhan (later: Sisaket) province. During the whole period from 1907 to 1929
Prasat Preah Vihear was not given any remarkable publicity in Siamese,
Cambodian or French media.
2.) This
situation changed in early 1930. On January
29th 1930, Somdet Krom Phraya Damrong Rachanuphap (a younger
brother
of King Chulalongkorn and former Minister of Interior) visited Prasat Preah Vihear together
with one of his daughters and several Siamese officials from the
nobility. (=>
Foil 13: Photo with Prince Damrong 1) The
prince who was also a well-known expert in Thai and Southeast Asian
archaeology
was greeted in Preah Vihear by the French governor of Kompong Thom and
by Henri
Parmentier. (=>
Foils 14 and 15: Prince Damrong with Parmentier 2 & 3)
The
famous architect and art-historian Parmentier, member of the
École française
d’Extrême-Orient, led Prince Damrong personally through the
temple complex and
gave the Siamese guests some expert explanations. Several years later,
Damrong
published the impressions of his visit along with several photos in his
book
“Report on a survey of archaeological sites in monthon
Nakhòn Ratchasima
(จดหมายเหตุการเสด็จตรวจโบราณวัตถุสถานมณฑลนครราชสีมา). Although he undertook his visit to Preah
Vihear as a private person, Prince Damrong, who at that time held the
position
as Chief of the Supreme State Council (อภิรัฐมนตรี), was welcome by his French hosts as a
high-ranking state-guest. What is more, Damrong had to swallow a
“bitter pill”
when the French tricolor was hoisted for his “welcome”. As Damrong’s daughter remarked many years
later, her father did not dare to protest, given the arrogant and
intrusive
behaviour of the French and given the painful experiences of the past.
3.) In
1934/35 the Siamese government of Phot
Phahonyothin sent a survey mission to investigate the border in the
Dongrak mountain
range and, in particular, to determine the precise borderline in the
Preah
Vihear area. It was discovered for the first time that the French map
of 1907
(also called “Annex 1 map”) showed an erroneous borderline
placing the temple
on the wrong side. The real watershed was not running north of the
temple but
directly below the rock on which the main sanctuary of Preah Vihear is
situated. A second survey two years later confirmed this result.
It was
evident that the French experts made a fundamental mistake in 1907 when
mapping
the creek O’Tasem. The creek was running slightly further south
than determined
in 1907. (=> Foil 16: Course of the watershed)
In 1937,
Prasat Preah Vihear was declared national Thai cultural heritage, but
it was only
in 1939 that Luang Vichitr Vadakarn, the then Director-General of the
Department of Fine Arts (Krom Sinlapakòn), objected to the
French map of 1907. The government of Field
Marshal Phibun
Songkhram tried in vain to obtain a new agreement with the French
authorities
in Indochina. In a public declaration on October 11th 1940,
the
government in Bangkok unilaterally placed Prasat Preah Vihear and the
territory
north of the actual watershed under Thai protection. The temple was
inscribed
by the Department of Fine Arts as an ancient archaeological monument of
Thailand. Thereafter, a small group of soldiers was sent to hoist the
Thai flag
over Prasat Preah Vihear.
4.) After a
short and victorious military campaign
against the French colonial troops in Indochina, the Convention of
Tokyo was
concluded through the mediation of Japan on January 28th
1941. The
Convention envisaged the retrocession to Thailand of all territories
ceded to
France in 1904 and 1907. Through this stipulation Preah Vihear was
placed once
again under Thai sovereignty. (=> Foil 17: Territorial gains in 1941) After the war, Thailand had to return all
territories that she got during World War II and by end of 1946 the status quo ante was restored. However, the Thai troops were not withdrawn
from the Preah Vihear temple and its surrounding. The government in
Bangkok
always assumed that both the Franco-Siamese treaty of 1904 and that of
1907
determined the watershed as the border line in the Dongrak region. The
watershed that counted in the view of the Thai was the real one not the
obviously
mistaken one on which the Annex I map was based. Three years later, in
1949,
with the consent of the Cambodian colonial government France filed an
official
complaint against Thailand. The complaint demanded the total withdrawal
of the
Thai civilian and military personal from Preah Vihear. Thailand ignored this demand and clung to the
status quo. There was no further official protest from the French side
until
the release of Cambodia into complete independence in November 1953.
5.) Shortly
thereafter the government in Phnom Penh
sent three guardians to watch the Temple, but they were sent back by
the Thai
authorities. When the Cambodian ambassador in Bangkok informed the Thai
government about his own government’s intention to dispatch
troops to Prasat
Preah Vihear to take possession of the Temple, an armed police unit was
immediately sent to the area to prevent such action of the Cambodian
authorities. In spite of Cambodian protests, the status quo with Thai
physical
presence in the Preah Vihear area remained unchallenged during the next
four
years.
It
seemed that the influential governor of Siem Reap province, Dap Chuen,
turned a
blind eye to the Thai presence in Preah Vihear. Due to domestic
political
problems in Cambodia and fostered by the ascension to power of the
authoritarian
nationalist military regime of Marshal Sarit Thanarat in Bangkok, the
smouldering conflict escalated in the summer 1958 and culminated in the
severance of relations in November of the same year.
In
October 1959, the government in Phnom Penh appealed to the
International Court
of Justice in The Hague to make a final decision on the sovereignty of
Prasat
Preah Vihear.
The Judgment of The Hague of 15 June
1962 and its Consequences
It took almost three
more years until the International Court of Justice (ICJ) pronounced a
judgement. To reconstruct and analyse in detail the proceedings of the
Preah
Vihear Case would be beyond the scope of this presentation and my
competence
because complex questions of international law would have to be
addressed. Thus
I would like to undertake the more modest endeavour to summarize only
the
judgement as such and its most relevant reasoning. First of all, it
should be
emphasized that the Preah Vihear Case probably was one of the most
complicated
and most contested cases about which the ICJ had to render a judgement. The ICJ had to decide on the following five
demands of the Cambodian government. (=> Foil 18)
1. The
binding character of the French map of 1907 according to international
law;
2. The
fixation of the Thai-Cambodian border in the Dongrak sector according
to the
above mentioned map;
3. The
sovereignty of Cambodia over Prasat Preah Vihear;
4. The
obligation of Thailand to withdraw her military
forces “from the ruins of the Preah Vihear temple”;
5. The
restitution of all objects of cultural value which Thailand had removed
from
the temple.
1.)
As to the first two demands of the Cambodian side – namely a.) To
determine
that the French map of 1907 had binding character according to
international
law; and b.) To define the actual border between Cambodia and Thailand
in
correspondence to this map – the ICJ made the decision that these
two demands
were beyond the jurisdiction of the Court [The exact course of state
borders
have to be determined by bilateral negotiations between the concerned
states.]
2.)
However, the ICJ evaluated the first two Cambodian demands indirectly,
by using
the validity of the French map as a major argument with regard to the
demands
3–5 of the Cambodian government.
3.)
The ICJ decided with nine to three votes in favour of the demands 3 and
4. It
stipulated that a.) Preah Vihear was situated on “territory under
the
sovereignty of Cambodia; and b.) That Thailand was obliged to withdraw
from the
temple and its “vicinity” all military and police forces as
well as other
security personnel.
4.)
The ICJ decided with seven to five votes that Thailand was obliged to
restitute
to Cambodia all artifacts which had been removed from the temple or its
surroundings since 1954.
The “Yes Votes”
phrased the judgement of the majority, basing their arguments above all
on the
validity of the French map of autumn 1907 (scaled 1:200,000) and
secondly on
the absent protest of the Thai authorities against this map. Also, in
the view
of the majority of judges the fact that Prince Damrong never complained
against
the hoisting of the French national flag during his visit of Preah
Vihear in
early 1930 was interpreted as tacit consent. Because of Damrong’s
high-ranking
position in the Siamese state apparatus, the private character of his
visit –
as emphasized by the Thai side – was refuted. Damrong’s
archaeological
fact-finding mission was given an at-least “half-official”
character.
The dissenting opinions
of those judges rejecting the Cambodian demands strongly emphasized the
claims
of the Thai government to exercise sovereignty over Preah Vihear. The
longest
and most detailed dissenting opinion was given by the Australian judge,
Sir
Percy Spender, who did meticulous historical research by studying
in-depth the
proceedings of the proceedings of the mixed Franco-Siamese commission
of
1904–1907.
The dissenting opinions
focused on the circumstance that neither Siam nor France ever departed
or
intended to depart from the principle of the watershed as borderline in
the
Dongrak sector. Expert opinions of several internationally recognized
geologists from the Netherlands had proven that the watershed between
the Nam
Mun and the Mekong was running directly below Prasat Preah Vihear, not
only in
1962 but also at the beginning of the twentieth century. Moreover, the
Australian judge Sir Percy Spender argued that the French map was not
binding
according to international law as it did not bear the signatures of any
high-ranking
French government official.
The judgement of The
Hague was greeted with storms of enthusiasm all over Cambodia. In
Thailand, on
the other hand, the judgement sparked off waves of protests. People
were in
shock and called the day when the ICJ announced its judgement the
“Shameful June
15th 1962” (15 มิถุนาวันอัปยศ).
After the stormy
protests had faded away and the Thai legal experts had examined in
detail the
(definitely ambiguous) judgement of The Hague, Foreign Minister Thanat
Khòman (ถนัด คอมันตร์) announced on July 6th 1962 the official
statement of the
Thai government. (=> Foil 19: Map
showing the disputed zone)
This statement became the basis of the legal viewpoint of all Thai
governments
ever since:
1.) The ICJ
has not made any decision on the
course of the border or the legally binding character of the French map
of
1907. Therefore, Thailand continues to claim the whole territory north
of the
real watershed in the Preah Vihear sector.
2.) Although
the ICJ does not possess any means to
enforce the implementation of its judgement, Thailand will nevertheless
submit
to all three decisions of the Court, though under protest. That means
the Thai
government recognizes that the temple, but only the temple, is under
Cambodian
sovereignty. But as for the rest of the territory that is situated
between the
“real border” (defined by the watershed, according to the
Thai standpoint) and
the borderline marked in the French map, this land is considered as
part of
Thailand. Therefore, Thai troops should only be withdrawn from the
temple
itself and its immediate vicinity, not from the other territory which
the
government in Phnom Penh considered as land under Cambodian
sovereignty. In
this context it was of great symbolic importance that the Thai
soldiers, when
withdrawing from Preah Vihear, did not lower their national flag but
cut through
the flagpole at its base and carried it, with the flag still at full
mast but
without allowing it to touch the ground, out of the temple.
3.) Decision
5 of the judgement is irrelevant as
artifacts stolen by the Thai would not exist. Indeed, the Cambodian
government
was unable to present a list of such artifacts neither at The Hague nor
afterwards.
This official Thai
position, though unchanged over the following decades, was not without
ambiguities. The government in Bangkok soon produced a map with a scale
of
1:50,000 delineating the border in the Preah Vihear border region. The
border
line marked on that map followed the real watershed and left only the
Preah
Vihear temple and its immediate surroundings on the Cambodian side of
the
border.
Thai
military strongman, Prime Minister Sarit, solemnly declared to the Thai
people:
“Even though Cambodia gained Prasat Preah Vihear, it got only the
broken ruins
and only the land bearing Prasat Preah Vihear. The soul of Prasat Preah
Vihear
will, however, permanently stay with us Thai. The Thai people will
always
remember that our Prasat Preah Vihear has been stolen.”
Some
people in Thailand event went further and argued contrary to the
ICJ’s ruling
that their country was forced only to recognize Cambodian sovereignty
over the
Temple but that this would not include the land upon which the Temple
was
built. On the other side, the Cambodian government insisted that the
ICJ
Judgement of June 15th 1962 had solved the Thai-Cambodian
border
conflict in the Preah Vihear area once and for all. It insisted that
the
Judgement was not restricted to its operative parts alone but included
the
reasoning parts as well.
In
the years and decades following the ICJ’s ruling, in bilateral
negotiations the
Thai and Cambodian governments failed to agree on a final delineation
of their
800 km long border, including the Preah Vihear section. This failure is
basically related to political developments in Cambodia. In 1970,
Cambodia
became a sideshow in the second Indochina War. During two decades of
civil war,
foreign intervention and murderous revolution, several Cambodian
regimes and
resistance movements became dependent on Thai political, military, and
humanitarian support. They accepted relunctantly a modus vivendi, which
allowed
the Thai a largely unrestricted access to the temple complex. A new
situation
occured in 1997 after the full restoration of peace in Cambodia.
Preah
Vihear as UNESCO World Cultural Heritage Site
Having analysed the
historical background of the Preah Vihear conflict, I would like to
have a look
at the political dynamics of the current dispute.
At the beginning of
the last decade Cambodia and Thailand were seriously planning to
jointly inscribe
the contested temple on the UNESCO World Heritage List. On June 7th
2000, the governments in Phnom Penh and Bangkok (the latter still under
Prime
Minister Chuan Leekpai of the Democrat Party) signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) “on the Survey and Demarcation of Land
Boundary” which
sought to pave the way for a solution of the Preah Vihear dispute and
other
unresolved border problems. A Joint Boundary Commission was established
for
that purpose. From 2002 until 2007 there was an ongoing discussion
between both
sides as to whether Thailand should give her consent to
Cambodia’s decision to
nominate Prasat Preah Vihear as a Cambodian World Heritage site or
whether the
Temple should be jointly nominated by Thailand and Cambodia. Finally,
in 2007,
Cambodia requested a unilateral registration.
This
move was objected to by the military-appointed Thai government of
General
Surayudh which tried to persuade the Cambodian side to accept a joint
Cambodian-Thai
inscription of Preah Vihear as a UNESCO World Heritage site. One of the
main
arguments was that the only practical access to the temple was from the
Thai
side of the border. Besides, several smaller temples and water
reservoirs were
situated in the “contested zone” claimed by both countries.
At the 31st
annual UNESCO meeting in Christchurch, New Zealand, in 2007 the Thai
government
insisted on that solution which prompted the UNESCO to postpone a
decision to
the 32nd annual meeting in Quebec in July 2008. But in
spring 2008
the Samak government changed the Thai position and accepted the
registration of
Prasat Preah Vihear as an exclusively Cambodian World Heritage site.
Foreign Minister
Nopphadon Patthama declared the Memorandum of Understanding which he
had
negotiated with the Cambodian side as an important diplomatic success
of his
government because the Cambodian government had taken the pledge to
restrict
the registration of Prasat Preah Vihear to the territory immediately
surrounding the temple, presenting a map in order to prove that no
parts of the
“disputed zone” were part of the deal. The “Joint
Thai-Cambodian Declaration”
did not imply an agreement on the border at the Preah Vihear sector.
The then
parliamentary opposition, however, appealed to the Supreme
Constitutional Court
which decided that the “Joint Declaration” indeed had a
legally binding
character and therefore needed approval by the parliament, according to
Article
190 of the Thai constitution of 2007. As the government had missed to
obtain
parliamentary approval before signing the “Joint
Declaration”, the government
needed either to seek this approval afterwards or to revoke the
“Joint
Declaration”. Facing growing public pressure, especially from the
People’s
Alliance for Democracy (“Yellow Shirts”), the Samak
government chose the second
option. The government of Somchai Wongsawat who succeeded Samak as
Prime Minister
in August 2008 even sent a letter to the President of the UN Security
Council
stating that Thailand “does not recognize [the Annex I] under the
Memorandum of
Understanding in 2000 as the basis for demarcation.”
In the
view of Cambodian law experts this was, however, a futile attempt to
avoid an
eventual recognition of the Thai-Cambodian border on the basis of the
French-drawn map of 1907, as the MoU of 2000 was “a binding
international
agreement.”
The
Preah Vihear Discourse in Thailand
In the following
chapter I want to discuss how the conflict was perceived in the Thai
public and
how it was exploited by the contending political factions for their
respective
political agendas. The many publications on this matter which have
appeared in
Thailand during the last three years can roughly be divided into three
main
groups reflecting three very different approaches to a solution of the
Preah
Vihear dispute. The first approach can be labeled a
“hard-line” approach which
demands that any Thai government should be uncompromising in the
defence of
Thailand’s legal position which had been left unchanged since
1962. This
approach is most strongly advocated by the “People’s
Alliance for Democracy” –
the so called Yellow Shirt movement – and called
“ultra-nationalist” by its
enemies. The second, more flexible approach advocates compromises with
the
Cambodian side to reach an end of the deadlock though, if feasible, not
at the
expense of Thai sovereignty over the 4.6 km2 large disputed
area.
The second tendency is supported with variations by the main political
parties,
including the Democrats and the pro-Thaksin “Phüa Thai
Party”, as well as
probably a majority of the Red Shirt movement. A third and last
approach is
supported by radical intellectuals and a minority of the Thai public.
It
favours Thai acceptance of the Cambodian legal position as an
unavoidable price
which the Thai people have to pay to live in peace with their eastern
neighbour. The three approaches are discussed by analyzing
paradigmatically
their most prominent publications.
1.) Phuchatkan Editorial Board
(ed.) กองบรรณาธิการผู้จัดการเรียบเรียง 2008. ปราสาทพระวิหาร ความจริงที่
คนไทยต้องรู้ [Prasat Phra Wihan: The Truth which
the Thai
should know]. Bangkok. (=>
Foil 20: Book cover)
The editors of this volume are close to the
“People’s Alliance
for Democracy” (PAD or พันธมิตรประชาชนเพื่อประชาธิปไตย) which was fighting with non-parliamentarian methods
– blockade of the
government house and Suvarnabhumi International Airport – the
Thai prime
ministers Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat as
“nominees” of former Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The
editors of this book take a decidedly nationalist standpoint with
regard to the
sovereignty over Prasat Preah Vihear as is clearly visible at the book
cover
which shows the Thai national flag flying over the temple ruins –
instead of
the Cambodian flag as is the reality.
The anonymous authors of this book accuse
the Samak government of abandoning unilaterally Thailand’s claims
on Prasat
Preah Vihear, a claim to which all Thai governments since 1962 had
abided by.
Furthermore, Cambodia, now encouraged by the decision of the UNESCO,
would be
tempted to enforce her sovereignty over the 4.6 km2 “disputed
zone”
as well. If the Cambodian side started to build hotels, markets, police
stations and customs facilities, or even a casino in this zone, it
could do so
relying upon the backing of the International Community. Moreover, the
Samak
government was accused of having secretly abandoned Thai sovereignty
over
Prasat Preah Vihear (including the disputed area) in exchange of
economic
concession of the Hun Sen government to the Shinawatra Corporation in
the
coastal province of Koh Kong in southwestern Cambodia. (=>
Foil 21) The book also contains as an appendix a transcript
of PAD
leader Sondhi Limthongkul’s famous speech of May 9th
2008 in which
he explained for the first time what he called the Samak
government’s “hidden
agenda” on the Preah Vihear issue. Sondhi appeals repeatedly to
Thai patriotism,
but he does so without insulting the Cambodian people and its culture.
Even
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen is not personally attacked as
Sondhi’s main
target is the Thai government and its unwillingness to defend
“national
interests”. He states (p. 103):
“I do not want our people, our descendants,
accuse him (Samak, VG) of selling the nation only for getting
advantages with
regard to gas concessions, which a certain person (Thaksin, VG)
currently
negotiates with Prime Minister Hun Sen. I do not accuse him, but I do
not want
this to happen. I want him, our Prime Minister, to be cautious. I am
sure that
he loves the nation, that he loves the country. But so far he has not
taken any
concrete action in any of the issues which I raised. He has not yet
demonstrated
his love for the people. … He has allowed the Cambodians to
nominate [Prasat Preah
Vihear] unilaterally. This gives rise to the suspicion that he might be
involved in the conspiracy to hand Prasat Preah Vihear over to Cambodia
in
exchange for gas concessions.”
Other publications of the PAD network
contain similar allegations of a political conspiracy of the
pro-Thaksin forces
to abandon Thai claims on Prasat Preah Vihear for economic benefits
elsewhere.
Most of these publications are of limited analytical value, when
compared to
the one presented above. They are clearly not written for an academic
audience
but for providing arguments on the “political battlefield”.
2.) Bowornsak Uvanno ศ.
ดร. บวรศักดิ์ อุวรรณโณ ราชบัณฑิต 2008. แฉเอกสาร
„ลับที่สุด“ ปราสาท
พระวิหาร พ.ศ. ๒๕๐๕-๒๕๕๑ [Disclosing “top
secret” documents
on Prasat Phra Wihan, AD 1962–2008]. Bangkok:
Matichon. (=> Foil 22: Book
cover)
The author of this book, Professor
Bowornsak Uvanno, a member of the Thai Royal Insitute, is one of the
leading
Thai experts on international law. From 1988 to 1990 Achan Bowornsak
was part
of the young advisor team of Prime Minister Chatichai Chunhawan;
thereafter he
worked for various governments as legal advisor, including the
governments of
Thaksin Shinawatra and of Surayudh Chulanont. Bowornsak's political
position is
that of a Thai patriotism which is based on the recognition of the
reality. The
author argues that the Thai people should accept the 1962 judgement of
the ICJ
painful as this may be for many Thai. Instead of dreaming to regain the
temple
itself, Thai diplomacy should concentrate on defending the Thai claims
on the
“disputed zone”. Therefore the book cover does not show
like in the previous
one the Thai flag over the ruins of the Preah Vihear temple but the
national
flag of Cambodia as is the reality of today.
A similar line of arguments is taken by
Vichitvong na Pombejra’s more popular book ปราสาทพระวิหาร
มุมมองใหม่ในบริบทของประวัติศาสตร์ความเกี่ยวข้องระหว่างไทยกับกัมพูชา [The Phra Wihan Temple: New Perspectives in
the Context of Thai-Cambodian History] (Bangkok 2009). The author
endorses a reconciliation of Thai and Cambodian national interests on
the basis
of “peace, friendship and brotherhood” as the final chapter
of his book is
entitled. Vichitvong arrives at the final conclusion that “at the
same time the
World Committee would be happy if both countries expressed their
intention to
adjust the status of Prasat Preah Vihear to become their joint World
Heritage
of which there are already examples in many places of the world.”
(p. 136).
3.) Charnvit Kasetsiri ชาญวิทย์
เกษตรศิริ 2008. ปราสาทเขาพระวิหาร
หลุมดำ-ลัทธิชาตินิยม-ประวัติศาสตร์แผลเก่า-ประวัติศาสตร์ตัดตอน-กับบ้านเมืองของเรา [Preah Vihear Temple: A Black Hole-Nationalism-Wounded
History and Our
Country: Siam-Thailand]. Bangkok:
The Foundation for the Promotion of Social Sciences and Humanities
Textbooks
Project. (=>
Foil 23: Book cover)
Charnvit Kasetsiri is one of the most
influential Thai historians of today. The former rector of Thammasat
University
is a harsh critic of an ethnic Thai nationalism. For this reason he has
been
campaigning for quite a while to abandon the country’s official
name “Thailand”
and replace it by the old name Siam (Sayam). In the Preah Vihear debate
Charnvit, together with a number of other Thai intellectuals adopts a
decidedly
anti-nationalistic perspective.
Charnvit claims that King Chulalongkorn
had concluded the border treaties with England and France for reasons
of state.
This great monarch considered the “loss” of Malay, Lao, and
Cambodian
territories as necessary – and even inevitable – sacrifices
to ensure the
independence and sovereignty of Siam: “All this happened in order
to live in
peace with the colonial powers France and England. In particular, it
was a
guarantee to safeguard the ‘independence and sovereignty’ (เอกราชและอธิปไตย) of the major part of the country. At the same
time this meant that the Siamese nobility was able to maintain its own
position
of power. This indeed brought about the rise of the ‘absolute
monarchy’ (สมบูรณาญาสิทธิราชย์).” Only the nationalist regime of Marshal Phibun
Songkhram, which emerged not long after the abolition of the absolute
monarchy
and changed the country’s name to “Thailand” in 1939,
initiated a discourse on
so called “territorial losses” of Siam in order to achieve
acceptance of a chauvinistic
and expansionist foreign policy. In the wake of this discourse even
ancient
Khmer temples such as Prasat Preah Vihear were “discovered”
as Thai cultural
heritage. The campaign of the PAD and the Democrat Party, Charnvit
argues, is
part of a dubious tradition of anti-Khmer Thai chauvinism.
In a more recent book publication (2009) –
ลัทธิชาตินิยมไทย/สยามกับกัมพูชา
และกรณีศึกษาปราสาทเขาพระวิหาร [Siamese/Thai Nationalism and Cambodia: A Case
Study of the Preah Vihear Temple] – Charnvit expands his
arguments outlined
above. Special emphasis is given to Prince Damrong’s friendly
attitude towards
the French. Charnvit argues that Damrong and many other princes of his
generation had genuinely accepted Siam’s territorial
losses during
the 1893-1909 period. Damrong’s friendly attitude towards his
French hosts when
visiting the Preah Vihear temple in January 1930 thus was not just
“oriental
politeness” but a reflection of honest feelings. As further
evidence to
substantiate this argument, Charnvit quotes from a book published in
1925 to
commemorate the fifteenth anniversary of King Vajiravudh’s
ascension to the
throne. This volume states that “Siam and France were getting
closer and their
relationship prospered” (แต่สยามกับฝรั่งเศสก็เริ่มสนิธกันและเจริญขึ้น).
Advocating
a “broad and open-minded” new form of nationalism”
which he also calls pracha-chat
niyom (“popular nationalism”), Charnvit proposes his
solution of the
“deadlock” in the Preah Vihear controversy. Among four
possible scenarios he
rejects two as either unrealistic or dangerous, namely a new appeal by
Thailand
to the ICJ to revoke its 1962 judgement; and the military occupation of
Prasat
Preah Vihear and the disputed area. A third alternative, namely
negotiations on
the basis of the Thai-Cambodian MoU of June 2000, would be more
reasonable. The
preferred solution, however, is the fourth alternative: the acceptance
of a new
way of thinking based on the “relinquishing” (ปลง)
of all territorial claims in the Preah Vihear
area. In other words, the Thai people should accept without reservation
the
Cambodian sovereignty over the temple and the disputed zone (pp.
172ff.).
It should be stressed
that a rejection of Thai nationalism in the Preah Vihear controversy
does not
necessarily mean a support of the Cambodian legal viewpoint. The
respected Thai
archaeologist Sisak Wanliphodom, whose pioneering role in the study of
the
Khmer and Lao dominated pre- and early history of northeast Thailand is
widely
acknowledged, emphasizes that the ruling elites in Bangkok and Phnom
Penh were
never genuinely interested in Prasat Preah Vihear, but for the local
Khmer and
Kui people living on both sides of the Dongrak mountain range this
sanctuary
has always been of vital importance. Therefore, any solution of the
conflict
should in the first place address the needs of the local population,
not those
of the national elites in Thailand and Cambodia. As a member of the Thai People’s Network (เครือข่ายประชาชนชาวไทย) Achan Sisak demanded in a petition to the
Thai government, dated January 26th 2009, that Thailand
should
either hold back or withdraw its consent to the inscription of Prasat
Preah
Vihear on the UNESCO World Heritage List.
Perspective
What are the
prospects for solving the conflict on Preah Vihear respectively Phra
Wihan?
When the conflict started to become violent three years ago, I
predicted that
the Cambodian government would be tempted to use the registration of
Preah
Vihear as a UNSESCO World Heritage Site to internationalize the
conflict with
Thailand and thus put pressure on the Thai government to yield to the
Cambodian
legal viewpoint. Exactly this has happened now when Phnom Penh invoked
the ICJ
in The Hague to make a final and binding decision on the border in the
Preah
Vihear sector. But for what reason should the ICJ depart from the
principle
that border disputed among states should be solved exclusively through
bilateral negotiations? Why should the ICJ make now a judgement on
Cambodian
demands which it refused to deal with in the operative clause of its
judgement
half a century ago? As Virachai Plasai, Thai representative at the ICJ
hearing
on May 30th 2011, aptly remarked, “Reversing the
logical order,
Cambodia is asking the Court to interpret the reasoning in its 1962
Judgement
in light of the operative part.”
The Cambodian
government is pushing vigorously towards a quick solution. Tens, if not
hundreds of thousands of visitors are expected to visit Preah Vihear
each year. Before
the escalation of the conflict in summer 2008, more than 60,000
tourists came
to visit Preah Vihear from the Thai side of the border against less
than 4,000
entering the temple from the Cambodian side. That is not astonishing,
given the
present-day infrastructure and the natural environment. Hotels and
other facilities
will be built in the wider vicinity of the temple which comprises large
parts
of the zone claimed by both countries. The Cambodian side has already
created
such faits accomplis by building a Buddhist temple (Wat Kaeo
Sikkhakhirisawara วัดแก้วสิกขาคีรีสวาระ) and several
residential buildings in the
disputed zone. It is even reported that three hamlets with 500-600
settlers
from central Cambodia were built by the Cambodian government close to
the
Prasat Preah Vihear on territory claimed by Thailand. These faits
accomplis
would most probably be used by any future ruling of the ICJ as a proof
of
“effective Cambodian control” of the 4.6 km2
disputed zone, as Thai
historian Suwit Thirasasawat predicts.
Any
Thai government, be it the former Democrat-led coalition or the new
government
mostly led by the Phüa Thai Party, will be pressured by
nationalist forces to
safeguard the territorial integrity of Thailand.
There does not remain
much time for a solution of a problem that started almost exactly a
century ago
due to borders drawn by colonial powers in Southeast Asia, then half a
century
later kept the International Court of Justice busy in a protracted and
most
complicated law case and nowadays places two countries before the
alternative:
Shall an ancient Hindu temple be used as a pretext to assert national
prestige
and legal viewpoints of the respective nation-state? Or should the
temple not
better be used to the advantage of both countries and peoples?
Perhaps it is not yet
too late to have Prasat Preah Vihear inscribed as a joint World
Heritage of
Cambodia and Thailand. The UNESCO decision of June 2008 still leaves
this
option open by stating that it recognizes “that Thailand has
repeatedly
expressed a desire to participate in a joint nomination of the Temple
of Preah
Vihear and its surrounding areas” and by considering further
“that
archaeological research is underway which could result in new
significant
discoveries that might enable consideration of a possible new
trans-boundary
nomination, that would require the consent of both Cambodia and
Thailand.”
(... pause) (=> Foil 24:
Thanks)
Distinguished guests,
thanks for your attention.
After the question
and answer session the meeting adjourned to the Alliance Cafeteria
where
members of the audience engaged Volker in more informal conversation
over a
beer, or two.
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Etrangères 1996. Recueil des traités
Franco-Siamois délimitant la frontière de
l’Indochine et du Siam (Lao-Thai)
1886–1946. Vientiane.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1961. Facts about the Relations between Thailand
and Cambodia.
Bangkok.
Monthicha Pakdeekong 2009.
“Who Owns the Preah Vihear Temple? A Thai Position.”
Journal of East
Asia and International Law, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 229–237.
Mißling, Sven and Maleen
Watermann 2009. “Die
doppelte Verantwortung der UNESCO: Zur zwiespältigen Ernennung des
Tempels von
Preah Vihear zum Weltkulturerbe.” Vereinte Nationen, No. 6, pp.
249–255.
Palmer, Larry 1977.
“Thailand’s Kampuchea Incidents: Territorial Disputes and
Armed Confrontation
along the Thai-Kampuchea Frontier.” News
from Kampuchea,
Vol. 1, No. 4.
Pavin Chachavalpongpun
2010. Reinventing Thailand:
Thaksin and his Foreign Policy. Singapore/Chiang Mai: Institute of
Asian
Studies/Silkworm Books.
Relations between Thailand and Cambodia 1959. Bangkok: Prachandra Press.
Silverman,
Helaine 2011. “Border
Wars: The Ongoing Temple Dispute between Thailand
and Cambodia
and UNESCO’s World Heritage List,” International
Journal of Heritage Studies,
Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 1–21.
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Future
speakers
338th Meeting –
Tuesday, September 13th 2011
Pu Sae - Ya Sae Spirit
Worship: Highlighting the two sacred mountains of Chiang Mai
A talk by Reinhard Hohler
339th
Meeting – Tuesday, November 15th 2011
"The
11th Panchen Lama (born in 1989): a
political recognition of a Tibetan spiritual master".
A
talk by Fabienne Jagou
Tuesday, March 20th
2012
"WWII in Northern Thailand: The
Flying Tigers and 64th Hayabusa Sentai Clash in Chiang Mai."
A talk and presentation by Jack
Eisner
Next
Meeting
338th
Meeting – Tuesday, September 13th 2011
Pu Sae -Ya Sae Spirit Worship:
Highlighting the two
sacred mountains of Chiang Mai
A
talk by Reinhard Hohler
According to some recorded
myths by the late Kraisri Nimmanahaeminda (1967), once when the Buddha
was
traveling in the area of present-day Chiang Mai, he met three
cannibals, a
couple with their son. This trio followed his trail in the hope of
making a
meal of him.
But when the Buddha
delivered a sermon to them, the cannibals converted to his religion and
abstained from taking human flesh to be allowed flesh of the
buffalo
instead. As for their son, he was so affected by the sermon that he
pleaded to
abstain forever from consuming meat of any kind, and asked to become a
monk.
Later he disrobed to lead the life of a hermit, spending his time in
meditation
in a cave a-top the mountain that later took his name: Doi Suthep.
After death,
the trio became roaming spirits.
To commemorate the original
spirit couple, called Grandfather Pu Sae – Grandmother Ya Sae,
there is a
yearly black buffalo sacrifice at Ban Pa Chi at Tambon Mae Hiya on the
foot of
Doi Kham on the 14th day of the waxing moon in June (in 2011 on June
15). If
the buffalo, which is killed with a big knife, will fall down in
parallel to
the Mae Hiya creek, the rain will be plentiful. If not, there will be a
drought. Similar rites are known from Laos (see Archaimbault 1959).
When the Buddha decided to
save the local people from the cannibals, the “rain god”
Indra was so delighted
and caused rain of silver and gold fall down. The places where the rain
fell
down have since then became known as Doi Kham or Golden Mountain and
Doi Ngoen
or Silver Mountain, later to be changed into Doi Suthep. Interesting to
note is
that Doi Kham is associated with the Grandmother Spirit Ya Sae, while
Doi
Suthep is associated with Pu Sae, the Grandfather Spirit, and this is
until
today.
This talk will be
a report and photos to illustrate the Pu Sae-Ya
Sae
ceremony on June 15 this year
Addenda 1 by Louis Gabaude: Other sources
available at the EFEO library, opposite the Alliance Française:
A. In Thai
Banchop
Thianthat 2532
[1989]. Pai Nakhon Wat lat Nakhon Tham
chom Prasat Khao Phra Wihan. Bangkok, Krung Sayam Printing Group,
34 p.
Call THAI. T. ARTS 0092.
Samnak
Phim
Phutthasansamphan 2503 [1960]. Banthuek
hetkan korani phiphat Thai-Khamen lae prawattisat Kha Phra Wihan chabap
sombun.
Bangkok, Saengthai Kanphim, [28]+670 p. Call THAI. T. HIST. 0478.
Seni
Pramoj 2505
[1962]. Khadi Phra Wihan. Bangkok,
Rongphim Samnak Thabian Nayok Rattamontri, [6]+216 p. Call: THAI. T.
HIST.
0822.
Sorachet
Worakhamwichai; Sommat Phonkoet 2535 [1992]. Prasat Khao
Phra Wihan. Buriram, Rewat Kanphim, 111 p. Call THAI.
T. ARCH. 0085.
Suriyawut
Suksawat
2536 [1993]. Prasat Khao Phra Wihan:
Satsanabanphot thi dotden thi sut nai phrak phuen Esia, Bangkok,
Muang Boran, 719 p. Call: THAI.
T. ARCH. 0130.
[Thailand] Krasuang Kantangprathet (transl)
2505 [1962]. Kham Phiphaksa San
Yutthitham rawang prathet Khadi Prasat Phra Wihan. Bangkok, Samnak
Thabian
Nayok Rattamontri, [10]+237 p. Call THAI. T. HIST. 0024.
Thida
Saraya 2535
[1992]. Khao Phra Wihan. Bangkok,
Muang Boran, 106 p. Call THAI. T. ARCH. 0019.
B. In Western
Languages
Arun Panupong 1953. Le
territoire Indochino-Thaïlandais. Paris: Faculté de Droit de
l’Université de Paris,
256 p. Thèse de Doctorat d’Université soutenue le 8
juin 1953. Call: THAIL. E.
HIST. A365K.
France; Thailande 1941. Convention
de paix entre la France et la Thaïlande [09/05/1941],
24+2+[11] p. Call: THAIL. E. HIST. F815C.
Graillon-Wieland, Magali 1999. Les
relations franco-siamoises. L’action et
la position du Siam
à propos des provinces occidentales du Cambodge, 1863-1946,
Vol. I (p.
1-294); Vol. II (p. 295-414). Thèse présentée pour
l’obtetnion du Doctorat ès
Lettres et Sciences humaines, Montpellier,
Université Montpellier III – Paul Valéry. Call:
THAIL. E. HIST. G743R-1 &
2.
Pensri Duke 1962. Les
relations entre la France
et la Thaïlande (Siam)
au XIXe siècle d’après les archives des Affaires
étrangères. Bangkok,
ix+328+vi p.
Call: THAIL. E. HIST. P418R.
Robequain, Charles 194?. Les
territoires cédés à la Thaïlande par les
récents traités. Leur
valeur humaine et économique. Paris:
École nationale de la France d’Outre-Mer, 74 p. Call:
THAIL. E. HIST. R638T.
Vichitr Vadakarn, Luang 1941. Thailand’s
Case. [Bangkok],
4+37 p. Call: THAIL. E. HIST.
V634T.
Addenda 2 by
L.G.: Other sources in Thai available at Louis Gabaude’s house:
Panthep Phuaphongphan 2554 [2011]. Khamtuean sutthai: Ratcha-anachak thai
kamlang cha sia dindaeng (Chabap sombun). Bangkok, Samnakphim Ban Phra Athit,
334 p.
Rom Bunnak 2552 [2009]. Songkhram
lae khwamkhaen Thai-Frangset. Bangkok, Sayambanthek, 160 p.
Saisakun Dechabut 2552 [2009]. Sia
dindaen hai chakkrawatniyom samai la
ananikhom. Bangkok,
Rakkaeo, 274+ [12] p.
Santi Phakdikham 2552 [2009].
“Prasat Khao Phra
Wihar: chak ‘Sisikharisuan’ thueng ‘Pheah
Vihear’ in Santi Phakdikham, Khamen “thok
Sayam”, Bangkok,
Sinlapawatthanatham, p. 174-186.
Thamnong Pracharak 2553 ’2010]. Nam yok ok Thai-Frangset: Khadi phiphat Prasat
Phra Wihan tang tae adit thueng yuk moradok lok. Bangkok,
Samnakphim Ro.
So. 229, 175 p.
Addenda 3 by L.G.: Maps
Map Nr. 1: Map used by the International Court of Justice in 1962 (Source: Panthep
Phuaphongphan 2554 [2011]. Khamtuean sutthai:
Ratcha-anachak thai
kamlang cha sia dindaeng (Chabap sombun). Bangkok, Samnakphim Ban Phra Athit,
p. 98
& 99.)
Map
Nr. 2: Disputed area by Thailand. Source:
http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.cambodia.org/Preah_Vihear/images/thai_document_map_preah_vih.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.cambodia.org/Preah_Vihear/%3Fhistory%3DA%2BKhmer%2BHeritage&h=532&w=450&sz=52&tbnid=ZdGcC1sAAc2iFM:&tbnh=90&tbnw=76&prev=/search%3Fq%3Dpreah%2Bvihear%2Bmap%26tbm%3Disch%26tbo%3Du&zoom=1&q=preah+vihear+map&docid=joVh1S2vh2tElM&sa=X&ei=abtgTsSLNMKqrAeH3eEP&ved=0CDwQ9QEwBQ&dur=319
